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# What the spy cases should teach us

In the Old Testament, Joshua, who "sent out two men to spy secretly" (Joshua 2:1) was the first recorded case officer; however it was Sun Tsu in 5th century B.C. China who provided the first written guidelines for espionage.

Defectors from the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and Cuban surrogates say that Sun Tsu's *The Art of War* is required reading for every upwardly mobile spy master. Indeed, a framed copy of Sun Tsu's most important dictates is prominently displayed in the office of East Germany's veteran spy chief, Marcus Wolf.

Today's disciples of Sun Tsu see the spying exploits that the Walker ring is charged with as a classic demonstration of "inside agents, whose sole desire is to take advantage of times of trouble to extend the scope of their own abilities," and who, as a part of what he termed "The Divine Skein," are the "treasure of a sovereign" to be "rewarded liberally with gold and silk."

While reportedly in the Walker case gold and silk were replaced with silver bars and cash, the concept of the "Divine Skein" — that information may be gathered in as a fish by pulling carefully on a single cord, and that thus the various threads of a net are drawn together — was allegedly used to penetrate the compartmentalized protective systems of the U.S. Navy.

That a suspect such as John Walker — who has pleaded not guilty to the espionage charges against him, as has his son — could exist to pervert and abuse on behalf of the Soviet Union the loyalties of his family, friends, and employees may be shocking and disgusting; but it was not surprising to our counterintelligence agencies, particularly the FBI.

Among those now before the courts on espionage charges are a former CIA employee, Karl Kroecher; a Naval Intelligence analyst, Samuel Morrison; an Army Intelligence officer, Richard Smith; and an FBI agent who had been assigned to counterintelligence duties, Richard Miller.

Counterintelligence officials already were aware of the extent of the damage done by the KGB in recent years through a number of spies now serving prison terms. Among these are David Barnett, who betrayed CIA intelligence operations in Asia; William Bell, an engineer who sold the Stealth bomber's radar secrets; Thomas Cavanagh, caught in an FBI "sting" operation also trying to sell Stealth technology; William Kampiles, a CIA officer who sold vital information about our intelligence satellites; and Christopher Boyce at TRW and his partner, Andrew Lee, who traded America's electronic intelligence secrets for the money needed to buy narcotics.

Paid spies, now euphemized as "assets" — "spies for hire" — have always been considered expendable by the Soviets. There have been times when the Soviets have undertaken exchanges and escapes for their spies, such as in the cases of professional Soviet intelligence officers like Col. Rudolf Abel, Gordon Lonsdale, and George Blake; the notorious British Intelligence ideological defectors Philby, Burgess, and McLean; and Robert Soblen. But there will be no exchanges or escape routes devised for those in the Walker case. Instead, the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti* (KGB) (Committee for State Security), and its military intelligence competitor, the *Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye* (GRU) (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Army General Staff), are most certainly already seeking replacements for the alleged Walker apparatus.

Some recruits will be paid for their treachery. Others may be blackmailed. A certain number of agents already recruited but kept in reserve because their areas of access may have overlapped with the alleged Walker network, will be activated. The ideological networks will be scanned by Moscow to identify sympathizers with appropriate qualifications; and their "agents of influence" will do their best to confuse and diffuse the issues of the spy case and security by planting false themes.

Among those "disinformation" themes are that there are no ideological spies today, only those who operate for money; that loyalty among Americans is extinct; that there is no point in attempting to modernize national defenses with expensive, superior, and expensive weapons, since the Soviets will steal the secret technology; and that we can eliminate spying and the cost of counterintelligence by agreeing to peace at any price with the Soviets.

In the late 1950s, there were only some 150 suspected Soviet bloc intelligence officers active in the United States. By the mid-1980s, counterintelligence officials say that the number had grown to more than 800. As details of the Walker investigation demonstrated, each KGB or GRU case officer is expected to recruit and handle at least a half-dozen "assets."

Does this mean that there are nearly 5,000 Americans supplying information to the Soviets? Counterintelligence officers believe that there are. But we should keep in mind that Sun Tsu also is read closely in the J. Edgar Hoover Building. We can be sure that some of the American "assets" of the Soviet espionage agencies — including some of their case officers — operate under the direction of the

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FBI. In the world of espionage and counterespionage, the provision of false and misleading information to your enemy by double agents is crucial. And double agents, wrote Sun Tsu, "are to be tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed."

Over the past decade we have seen scores of spies — spies for pay, double agents, ideological spies, agents of influence, and spies paying off grudges against the system — exposed in the Free World. Among them have been high government officials, secretaries, scientists, executives, technicians, journalists, clerks, members of the military, housewives, and politicians.

In America's open society, the work of espionage agents is facilitated not only by the wealth of information either in the public domain or only lightly restricted. Even more devastating is the atmosphere of hostility and distrust toward America's main counterintelligence agency, the FBI, that is fostered by our domestic Communists and their allies who wrap their intent in a false flag of civil liberties. The reduction of the FBI's primary sources — its informants — from the thousands to the hundreds in the past decade has put our national security at risk.

Those familiar with the operations of the KGB know their priorities — penetration of the U.S. government, especially the State

Department, National Security Council, Congress, and the intelligence agencies. The high-tech industries, the defense plants, the military, and the institutions of our society are on the assignment boards of the KGB's Derzhinsky Square headquarters in Moscow, and KGB Directorate T, responsible for science and technology acquisitions, carries them out in competition with the GRU.

**I**n the ongoing intelligence war — a cold war that is key in preventing a hot one — the Walker spy case must be seen in perspective as one among many but more shocking than most for the damage the government says it has done, the length of time it operated, the manner in which its agents and collaborators were recruited, and the degree to which it has tarnished the reputation of the U.S. Navy and the hundreds of officers and enlisted men who protect our secrets with their lives. Yet even an intelligence defeat such as the one the government says has been dealt by John Walker can be turned to advantage if used to alert Americans to KGB recruitment tactics and methods, and to expand America's counterintelligence operations.

Of even greater significance must be the new awareness generated by the Walker case that while talking peace, the Soviet Union is preparing for war.

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